WORKING PAPERS
The Effect of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Vocational College Student’s Performance in High-stakes Exams, with Naomi Gershoni. Helsinki GSE Discussion Papers 15/2023
Abstract: A growing literature discusses negative effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on college students’ learning outcomes. We extend this literature to vocational education and study the effect of the first phase of the pandemic on students’ performance in high-stakes state exams across 31 Israeli vocational colleges. Two substantial advantages of this setting over previous studies are that exams were taken in person rather than on-line and that they were graded centrally and thus, were not exposed to subjective grading behavior. We estimate a difference-in-differences model, comparing early and late exams within students and across cohorts. While official grades increased due to a change in the maximum score, students’ overall knowledge and exam attendance decreased. Poor internet access is the most likely driver of these negative effects compared to low socioeconomic status, more online learning, and higher infection rates.
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Performance based incentive payment for loan officers in Microfinance, with Erika Deserranno and Lame Ungwang. Randomized Field Experiment in Uganda, initiated in fall 2018. Fieldwork completed. Data collection ongoing. AEA registry number: AEARCTR-0004529.
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Description
We study the effect of incentive schemes (bonuses) on the performance of credit officers working for a large microfinance institution. Specifically, we compare between a bonus scheme based on individual performance and a bonus scheme based on team performance. We use a randomized control methodology with randomization at the branch level, and ask how individual level as compared to team level bonus contracts affect loan quality, credit officer effort, the prevalence and intensity of team work, credit officer well-being and borrower pool characteristics.​
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JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS
Gershoni, N. and Stryjan, M., 2023. Do Deadlines Affect Project Completion? Experimental Evidence from Israeli Vocational Colleges. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 205, pp.359-375.
Ungated version link
Short summary: We study a large scale intervention aimed at increasing graduation rates in vocational colleges, addressing the procrastination in completing final projects -- a significant barrier to graduation. We established a fixed deadline for project defense in randomly selected departments, while control departments maintained flexible scheduling. Utilizing a difference-in-differences framework, we observed no impact of deadlines on project completion or graduation rates. Analysis of administrative and survey data indicate that deadlines do not affect outcomes, even when alternative constraints -- such as academic challenges or low perceived value of the diploma-- are not binding.
Bonnier, Evelina, Jonas Poulsen, Thorsten Rogall, and Miri Stryjan. "Preparing for genocide: quasi-experimental evidence from Rwanda." Journal of Development Economics 147 (2020): 102533.
Short summary: This paper examines how state-controlled community meetings can mobilize civilians into violence, using a Rwandan program that mandated citizens' participation in community work and political meetings every Saturday before the 1994 genocide. Exploiting weather-induced variations in meeting frequency, we find that increased rainy Saturdays led to a 17% reduction in civilian violence. Evidence suggests these meetings allowed local elites to spread propaganda and mobilize civilians. While often viewed as positive, community-building events, our findings reveal these meetings' potential for negative outcomes. Community meetings are powerful tools; their impact depends on leaders’ aims.
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A popular summary of the paper can be found here.
Media (Swedish): Forskning och Framsteg
Ahlin, Christian, Selim Gulesci, Andreas Madestam, and Miri Stryjan. "Loan contract structure and adverse selection: Survey evidence from Uganda." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 172 (2020): 180-195.
Short summary: While adverse selection is an important theoretical explanation for credit rationing it is difficult to quantify empirically. Studies of existing borrowers entail selection issues; while cross-sectional approaches may confound borrower risk with other factors. We address this by surveying urban Ugandan microenterprises, assessing responses to hypothetical contract offers with varying interest rates and collateral requirements. Adverse selection predicts lower interest rates or collateral increase uptake among less risky borrowers; advantageous selection suggests the opposite. We test these two theories, finding that lower interest rates or reduced collateral heighten demand, particularly for less risky firms. Our results support adverse selection and indicate that modifying loan products for microenterprises could significantly impact credit demand.
Deserranno, Erika, Miri Stryjan, and Munshi Sulaiman. 2019. "Leader Selection and Service Delivery in Community Groups: Experimental Evidence from Uganda." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11 (4): 240-67.
Short summary: In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on community-based groups for service delivery. This paper examines how leader selection methods impact leader identity and group service delivery. Partnering with the NGO BRAC, we randomly assigned Savings and Loan Groups to choose leaders via either public discussion or private vote. Leaders chosen by private vote are less positively selected based on socioeconomic traits and more representative of regular members. These groups are more inclusive, providing more credit to poor members and retaining them longer. Three years later, private vote groups remain more inclusive without sacrificing economic efficiency.
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Media: VoxDev Talks (Podcast) , World Bank Development Impact Blog
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
SMEs and Workers during Crises: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic in Uganda, with Francesco Loiacono, Andreas Madestam, Miri Stryjan, AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 2025, forthcoming.
Financial Inclusion and social outcomes, Miri Stryjan & Reut Barak Weekes, in Y. N Gez, R. Barak-Weekes and M. Kagan (eds) "International Development in Africa", Pardes books, 2019, (in Hebrew)
Sending money home - Remittances from the Somali diaspora in Sweden, Ekonomisk Debatt no. 3, 2009 (in Swedish, original title "Att skicka pengar till hemlandet – Remitteringar från den somaliländska diasporan i Sverige").
WORK IN PROGRESS
Inside the Production Function: The Effect of Financial Contracts on Growing Firms' Technology Use, with Selim Gulesci Andreas Madestam and Francesco Loiacono, Mimeo, Stockholm University. Randomized control trial in Uganda. AEA registry number: AEARCTR-0003062
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Description
We examine how key aspects of the most common form of financing-debt-may inhibit young firms' expansion. Starting a business entails learning and risk taking, implying that project returns to investment can start low but increase over time (in other words, be "backloaded") or be uncertain. Also, indivisible start-up costs often require large investments. Meanwhile, standard debt contracts available for micro-entrepreneurs from the formal or semi-formal financial sectors of many developing countries (such as microfinance) stipulate a constant repayment stream and caps on the initial loan size. The interaction of such features of the loan contract and the firm's production technology, may distort investment toward inputs that involve less learning, less uncertainty, and smaller projects; hampering firm growth. To shed light on the extent to which these theoretical mechanisms limit the effectiveness of micro-loans, we designed a randomized controlled trial where randomly chosen Ugandan firm owners, accepted for a loan, were offered amended contracts designed to alleviate one of these constraints. Treated firms, as well as a control group, are followed over a period of 5 years. The project will provide unique evidence on the constraints caused by the interaction of financial structure and technology use.