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Miri Stryjan

Assistant Professor  ·  Economics  ·  Aalto University

I am an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at the Aalto University School of Business, part of the Helsinki Graduate School of Economics. I chair the Development Economics Research Group of the Helsinki GSE.

I do research in development economics, political economics, and applied microeconomics, using field experiments and quasi-experimental methods to answer causal questions. Much of my current research studies different aspects of finance in developing countries, including loan contract structure, financial service adoption, and the motivation of loan officers in microfinance. I am also interested in how individuals and communities interact with and within institutions, broadly defined. This is exemplified by my work on community-based service delivery and community meetings. Recently I have also worked on education and inequality.

I hold a PhD from the Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholm University.

Contact

miri.stryjan@aalto.fi
Department of Economics, Aalto University School of Business
PO Box 21210, FI-00076 Aalto, Finland

Miri Stryjan
Photo: Aalto University / Nita Vera

Research

Published & Forthcoming

Published · 2026

Disconnected: The Unequal Impact of Online Learning on Minority Students

with Naomi Gershoni

European Economic Review, p.105356.

Online instruction holds the promise of expanding access to education for disadvantaged groups, yet it often deepens existing performance gaps. This study examines its impact on high-stakes exam outcomes, focusing on mechanisms driving differential effects for minority students. We leverage rich administrative data on students from five consecutive cohorts in 31 Israeli vocational colleges and the abrupt transition to online instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. A key advantage of our setting is that exams were held in-person and graded centrally, ensuring comparability to pre-pandemic performance. Using a difference-in-differences design that compares outcomes within students and across cohorts, we find significant declines in both exam attendance and demonstrated knowledge following the switch to online instruction. These effects are not explained by local infection rates or childcare responsibilities, and are especially pronounced among Arabic-speaking minority students, regardless of their socioeconomic status. Drawing on variation in internet infrastructure, residential crowdedness, language of instruction, and prior academic performance, we show that poor internet access is a central mechanism underlying the adverse effects among minority students. For majority-group students, negative effects are concentrated among weaker students, suggesting widening disparities within the majority group. For minority students, the difference by prior achievement is not statistically significant, and if anything, the drop is larger for higher achievers.

Published · 2025

SMEs and Workers during Crises: Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic in Uganda

with Selim Gulesci, Francesco Loiacono, and Andreas Madestam

AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 115, pp. 345–350.

We use a five-year panel of Ugandan SMEs, supplemented with phone-survey data from August 2020, to analyze how the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic affected profits and employment. Most firms had employees, enabling us to investigate whether — and how — the crisis reshaped SMEs' job-creation capacity, with particular focus on gender differences. Profits fell substantially for all firms, yet male entrepreneurs paradoxically expanded their workforce — suggesting that hiring under crisis may arise partly from social obligations. Meanwhile, female entrepreneurs bore heavier caregiving loads and relied more on extended family support, potentially hampering future growth through added caregiving and reciprocal obligations.

Published · 2023

Do Deadlines Affect Project Completion? Experimental Evidence from Israeli Vocational Colleges

with Naomi Gershoni

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 205, pp. 359–375.

We study a large-scale intervention aimed at increasing graduation rates in Israeli vocational colleges. In this context, the main reason for low graduation rates has been found to be the failure of students to complete the required final project. This may result from procrastination which is prevalent among students in many settings. To address procrastination, we introduce a deadline for final project defense in randomly selected departments while control group departments maintain the practice of scheduling defense dates on a rolling basis. We compare student performance over time in treated and control departments in a difference-in-differences framework and find no effect of deadlines on project defense or on graduation rates. A potential explanation for these findings is that there are other constraints faced by students, such as academic difficulties or a low perceived value of the diploma, which are not alleviated by the deadline. Using administrative and survey data, we find that deadlines have no effect even when the alternative constraints are not binding.

Published · 2020

Preparing for Genocide: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Rwanda

with Evelina Bonnier, Jonas Poulsen, and Thorsten Rogall

Journal of Development Economics, 147, p. 102533.

This paper shows how state-controlled community meetings can facilitate large-scale mobilization of civilians into violence. We analyze a Rwandan community program that required citizens to participate in community work and political meetings every Saturday in the years before the 1994 genocide. We exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations, and find that a one standard-deviation increase in the number of rainy Saturdays before the genocide decreased civilian violence by 17 percent. We find evidence that the meetings provided an arena for local elites to spread propaganda and bring people together. In research and policy, community meetings are often treated as positive, community building forces. Our results indicate that they can also lead to negative outcomes. This should, however, not suggest that such meetings are inherently destructive. Instead, community meetings should be understood as powerful tools and their effects depend on the political intention of the leaders.

Published · 2020

Loan Contract Structure and Adverse Selection: Survey Evidence from Uganda

with Christian Ahlin, Selim Gulesci, and Andreas Madestam

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 172, pp. 180–195.

While adverse selection is an important theoretical explanation for credit rationing it is difficult to quantify empirically. Many studies measure the elasticity of credit demand of existing or previous borrowers as opposed to the population at large; other studies use cross- sectional approaches that may confound borrower risk with other factors. We circumvent both issues by surveying a representative sample of microenterprises in urban Uganda and by measuring their responses to multiple hypothetical contract offers, varying in interest rates and collateral requirements. The two seminal theories on selection provide contradicting predictions following a change in the contractual terms. Under adverse selection, a lower interest rate or a lower collateral obligation should increase take up among less risky borrowers. By contrast, advantageous selection implies that take up should increase among the riskier borrowers. We test these two predictions by examining if firm owners respond to changes in the interest rate or the collateral requirement and whether higher take up varies by firms' risk type. We find support for the presence of adverse selection as contracts with lower interest rates or lower collateral obligations increase hypothetical demand – especially for less risky firms. Our results imply that changes to the standard loan product available to microenterprises may have substantial effects on credit demand.

Published · 2019

Leader Selection and Service Delivery in Community Groups: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

with Erika Deserranno and Munshi Sulaiman

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(4), pp. 240–267.

In developing countries, NGOs and Governments often rely on local community-based groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper provides causal evidence of how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes group service delivery. In collaboration with the NGO BRAC, we randomly assigned newly-formed Savings and Loan Groups to select their leaders using either (i) a procedure in which final outcomes are decided in a public discussion or (ii) a procedure in which final outcomes are decided in a private vote. Leaders selected with a private vote are found to be less positively selected on socioeconomic characteristics than those elected in the public procedure, and at the same time more representative of regular group members. Furthermore, selecting more representative leaders—through a private vote—results in groups that are more inclusive towards poor members by giving them more credit and retaining them longer. Three years after their creation, private vote groups are more inclusive than public discussion groups, without being less economically efficient.

Working Papers & Work in Progress

Working Paper

Local Institutions and Leader Incentives: The Political Economy of Rwanda's Fertility Transformation

with Maximilian Linek

Presentations: ESPE, CSAE, EEA Congress

Modern contraceptive use in sub-Saharan Africa remains low despite sustained investments. Rwanda is a notable outlier: uptake more than quadrupled in 2005-10, alongside sharp and lasting fertility declines. We study the role of two institutions in driving this change: performance contracts for leaders and local village meetings. Our data cover periods before and after a reform that incentivized local leaders to promote contraceptive adoption, with village meetings serving as a key implementation arena. Using rainfall to generate exogenous variation in meeting intensity, we find that meetings increased uptake only once performance contracts were in place, indicating that top-down factors shaped their effectiveness. After the reform, non-rainy Saturdays, which proxy for well-attended meetings, increase the likelihood of contraceptive adoption by 18% in the same month. Results are robust to another targeted outcome and to different rainfall thresholds. The meeting-driven increase in uptake is unlikely to be driven by improved access; suggestive evidence indicates that adoption was partly involuntary, consistent with pressure during meetings. Our findings shed new light on Rwanda's remarkable health gains and show that local institutions and performance incentives can complement each other in facilitating top-down policy implementation.

Working Paper

Effort or Endowments? Incentives and Morale among Credit Officers

with Erika Deserranno, Julia Salmi, and Lame Ungwang

Presentations: CEPR Symposium, WEFIDEV, CSAE  ·  AEARCTR-0004529

Individual incentives are designed to increase effort and performance. But they may also raise work pressure, reduce worker well-being, and worsen retention. These concerns are especially relevant in jobs where high measured performance does not necessarily reflect high individual effort, because outcomes are partly driven by factors outside the worker’s control. We study this issue among credit officers in Uganda, whose lending results depend on both their effort and the quality of the loan portfolios they are assigned. We compare individual incentives with two alternatives: team incentives, which pool assignment risk across workers, and portfolio rotation, which reduce persistent differences in portfolio quality over time. We find that individual incentives increase performance, especially by raising new loan disbursement, but also increase exit, reduce job satisfaction, and weaken group cohesion among workers assigned poorer portfolios. By contrast, team incentives and portfolio rotation substantially reduce exit relative to individual incentives, and team incentives also improve job satisfaction, workplace support, and stress. Overall, our results highlight a central trade-off: when workers start from unequal positions, the incentive scheme that generates the strongest performance may also impose the largest costs on morale and retention.

Work in Progress

Credit Contracts, Business Development and Gender: Evidence from Uganda

with Selim Gulesci, Andreas Madestam, and Francesco Loiacono

Randomized control trial in Uganda  ·  AEARCTR-0003062

Work in Progress

The Anatomy of Collective Decision Making: Voice and Choice in a Public Goods Game in Malawi

with Marina Caregnato-Garcia and Vesall Nourani

Lab-in-field experiment with farmer groups in Malawi  ·  AEARCTR-0001816

Work in Progress

Financial Inclusion to the Last Mile: Expansion of Retail Agent Networks in the Philippines

with Lisa Spantig

Pilot project in collaboration with IPA Philippines, Pre-registered on AsPredicted

Book Chapters & Miscellaneous

Book Chapter · 2019

Financial Inclusion and Social Outcomes

with Reut Barak Weekes

In Y. N. Gez, R. Barak-Weekes and M. Kagan (eds.), International Development in Africa: Between Theory and Practice, Pardes Books, 2019. [In Hebrew]

Journal Article · 2009

Sending Money Home: Remittances from the Somaliland Diaspora in Sweden

Ekonomisk Debatt, no. 3, 2009. [In Swedish: "Att skicka pengar till hemlandet – Remitteringar från den somaliländska diasporan i Sverige"]

Curriculum Vitae

Academic Positions
2020–
Assistant Professor, Department of EconomicsAalto University School of Business, Helsinki
2016–2020
Assistant Professor, Department of EconomicsBen-Gurion University of the Negev
Education
2016
PhD in EconomicsInstitute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholm University
2008
MSc in EconomicsStockholm University
Affiliations
Chair, Development Economics Research GroupHelsinki Graduate School of Economics
Fields
Development Economics  ·  Political Economics  ·  Applied Microeconomics

Teaching

Development Economics 1

Aalto University School of Business

PhD / MSc

Principles of Empirical Analysiss

Aalto University School of Business

BSc

Bachelor Thesis and Seminar

Aalto University School of Business

BSc

Scientific Thinking and Writing

Aalto University School of Business

BSc

Contact

Office Address

Department of Economics
Aalto University School of Business
PO Box 21210
FI-00076 Aalto
Finland